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Uncertainty, Modelling Monocultures and the 
Financial Crisis1 
Richard Bronk
2
 
Intellectual failures and the crisis 
There is no shortage of explanations of the economic and 
financial crisis that erupted in 2007. Indeed, at times there seem 
to be so many plausible explanations reinforcing one another that 
it is a wonder so few people saw the crisis coming. If ever there 
was an over-determined event, this appears to be it. The most 
popular culprit is the venality of some bankers; but, as John 
Cassidy points out, greed is a constant – “what economists call a 
‘primitive’ of the capitalist model”.3 To explain the crisis, we need 
to focus on what new factors had come into play. Some blame 
clearly attaches to the incendiary combination of three factors: the 
perverse impact of short-term remuneration structures on 
incentives, revealed failures in risk management and light-touch 
regulation, and the excessive build-up of private credit and global 
economic imbalances encouraged by a long period of very low 
US interest rates. This paper argues, however, that we need to 
look deeper at two closely related intellectual factors that underlie 
these policy errors and help explain why the crisis happened when 
it did. These are, first, the failure by most economists, bankers 
and policy-makers to appreciate the central importance of radical 
uncertainty, its link to innovation, and the limits it places on the 
usefulness of risk models; and, secondly, a pervading tendency to 
underestimate how far an emerging monoculture of economics 
and risk models biased analysis and constructed a dangerous 
homogeneity of behaviour. Only by addressing these 
misunderstandings can we draw the right conclusions about how 
to improve business strategies and policy responses. 
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The world of finance and economic policy has become driven to 
an unusual degree by theory and models, and a number of 
commentators have pointed the finger at intellectual failures 
underlying the construction and use of the dominant models of 
economics and risk analysis in the run-up to the crisis. Cassidy, 
for example, draws attention to the extraordinary reach in financial, 
policy and some academic circles of a „utopian economics‟ that 
ignored the importance of market failures and fostered an illusion 
of stability and predictability.
4
 One manifestation of this was the 
Efficient Markets Hypothesis. This posits that market prices are 
reliable indicators of fundamental value – because market 
participants are forced by competitive pressures to make optimal 
use of available information, avoid systematic errors in their 
forecasting, and update their expectations rapidly in the face of 
new evidence. Any deviation of market valuations from underlying 
fundamentals should be essentially random and short-lived. This 
hypothesis had enormous implications: markets were self-
adjusting and market prices were the best signals of emerging 
fundamentals and underlying value. Government and regulatory 
intervention might be needed to deal with information asymmetries 
and improve the transparency of information between market 
participants; but, beyond this, second-guessing the wisdom of 
markets was unlikely to be a good idea. Suffice it to say, this 
cheerful and optimistic creed – that the market knows best and 
efficiently prices available information and knowable risks – has 
taken a knock since 2007. Market expectations and pricing are 
revealed to have been close to delusional for a long time and 
driven by successive waves of exuberance and fear. 
A related intellectual failure highlighted by Robert Skidelsky was 
the failure to learn John Maynard Keynes‟ central lesson about the 
importance of uncertainty – uncertainty, that is, that cannot be 
captured by probabilistic calculation.
5
 Frank Knight first articulated 
this crucial distinction between uncertainty and measurable risk in 
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the 1920s;
6
 and for Keynes: “The outstanding fact is the extreme 
precariousness of the basis of knowledge on which our 
estimates of prospective yield have to be made. … [Our] 
existing knowledge does not provide a sufficient basis for a 
calculated mathematical expectation”.7 But, as Geoffrey 
Hodgson has shown, the Knight-Keynes concept of uncertainty 
almost disappeared from mainstream economics journal articles 
after the 1980s, as economists fell under the intellectual spell of 
the Rational Expectations Hypothesis and associated „model-
based prediction‟.8 Even more crucially for explaining the crisis, 
Knightian uncertainty was almost totally ignored by the burgeoning 
risk management industry. 
From the mid-1990s onwards, financial markets, regulators and 
much of the rest of the corporate and public sectors fell under 
another spell – what Michael Power has called the “grand 
narrative of risk management”.9 A whole range of new Value at 
Risk (VaR) and other models promised to calculate the risk of 
future loss or default on the basis of extensive analysis of data on 
the past; while an associated institutional culture of control 
systems and risk officers sought to manage decisions taken in 
uncertainty in a rational and scientific manner. As Power argues, 
the result of this seemingly defensive narrative was a dangerous 
illusion of control. The related illusion was, to quote from Andrew 
Haldane, that we had entered a “new era” of “simultaneously 
higher return and lower risk”, resulting from “a shift in the 
technological frontier of risk management”.10 In fact, the narrative 
of risk management depended largely on a failure to appreciate 
the vital distinction made by Knight and Keynes between 
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measurable risk and true „unmeasurable‟ uncertainty. Such 
uncertainty has for decades remained largely ignored and under-
theorised. 
Understanding uncertainty and its link to innovation 
Knight used the word „risk‟ to designate “measurable 
uncertainty”: here the possible outcomes are known; they can be 
classified in groups and assigned probabilities or projected 
distributions “either through calculation a priori or from statistics 
of past experience.” This is the realm of classic insurance 
markets – like fire insurance or life assurance – where the future 
can reasonably be assumed to be a shadow of the past. 
„Uncertainty‟, by contrast, was the name Knight gave to cases 
where no probability can be computed because, for example, the 
case is unique; and, for Knight, such uncertainty was central to 
entrepreneurial activity and to a proper understanding of how 
economies and markets function.
11
 Keynes agreed, noting that 
uncertainty is magnified by market speculation, “animal spirits” 
and “waves of optimistic and pessimistic sentiment, which are 
unreasoning and yet in a sense legitimate where no solid basis 
exists for a reasonable calculation”.12 
To get a feel for how negotiable this boundary between Knightian 
risk and uncertainty might be – for how far the risk management 
industry and regulators have been justified in recent decades in 
implicitly or explicitly assuming they could successfully ignore 
uncertainty or turn it into measurable risk – it is essential to analyse 
more carefully the different kinds and sources of uncertainty in 
markets. And to do this it is helpful to expand on two distinctions 
made by Skidelsky.  
The first distinction is between “asymmetric information” and 
“symmetric ignorance”.13 Information asymmetries, where one 
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party to a market transaction has an information advantage over 
another, can lead to opportunistic, even fraudulent, behaviour, to 
the mispricing of deals, or to thin markets characterised by such 
distrust between parties that trades dry up. The Efficient Market 
Hypothesis itself may have ignored such asymmetries, but they 
have nevertheless been extensively analysed in much of modern 
economic and regulatory theory. The solution to such problems is 
at least theoretically straightforward: more transparency and 
disclosure of information should help ensure that markets work 
more efficiently and that risks are priced correctly. The second 
sort of information problem is both more ignored and harder to 
solve, namely that of „symmetric‟ ignorance – genuine uncertainty 
faced by all parties. One key question then is how many of the 
information problems in this crisis were asymmetric and how many 
were symmetrical cases of real uncertainty. This is, of course, 
partly an empirical question that is difficult to answer. But a 
theoretical analysis of the causes of symmetrical uncertainty can 
give us some clue. 
Skidelsky‟s second distinction is between “epistemological” 
uncertainty, where relevant probabilities are unknown, and 
“ontological” uncertainty, where they are logically unknowable.14 
Epistemological uncertainty includes the inherent difficulty of 
grasping all the multifaceted aspects of what is going on and the 
sheer volume of information to be processed. It also relates to 
difficulties in understanding the non-linear dynamics of complex 
systems and the self-reinforcing emotional dynamics of market 
confidence and panic that make prediction fraught. Some 
progress has been made, and is possible, in shifting the boundary 
between such epistemological uncertainty and measurable risk, 
though non-linear and behavioural dynamics are not amenable to 
simple frequency distributions and precise definition of the likely 
spread of future returns. Ontological uncertainty, by contrast, 
implies the impossibility of knowing even the categories and 
possible nature of what has yet to be created or yet to evolve. As 
David Lane and Robert Maxfield note, this sort of uncertainty is 
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implied by radical innovation that revolutionises the parameters of 
markets and the range and nature of possible outcomes;
15
 and 
some non-linear dynamic systems may in time also allow for the 
emergence of genuine novelty. This kind of uncertainty can never 
be turned ex ante into measurable risk. The future opportunities 
and dangers we face are simply unknowable at the outset, and we 
must learn and adapt as we go along.  
It was George Shackle who first emphasised the creative genesis 
of much of the uncertainty we face. He wrote of our “own original, 
ungoverned novelties of imagination… injecting, in some 
respect ex nihilo, the unforeknowable arrangement of 
elements”.16 The future is unknowable because it is still to be 
created by the original choices we (and others) will make and new 
possibilities we (and others) will imagine. In other words, there is 
an inevitable ex ante ontological uncertainty about the direct 
outcome of any innovation or novel choice we make, and this 
uncertainty is compounded by uncertainty about the second-order 
creative reactions of others. Shackle‟s message is corrosive of 
the standard notion that forward-looking market valuations can be 
stable and efficiently priced – that there is a static reality „out there‟ 
on which rational expectations will converge in response to 
competitive pressures. As Shackle put it, “Valuation is 
expectation and expectation is imagination”.17 
In practice, of course, the future is not a complete „void‟ as 
Shackle seemed to suppose. It is in part rationally predictable – 
and some of the risks can be forecast – given observed and 
socially constructed regularities in behaviour. But the important 
point remains that Shackle was much more right than most 
modern economists and risk modellers would acknowledge, at 
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least in situations where novelty and innovation abound. They tend 
to ignore the fact that innovation and novelty create uncertainty and 
break predictable links between the past and the future. By 
disturbing previously stable regularities and changing key 
economic parameters, innovation undercuts the rationale for 
making probability forecasts on the basis of historical frequencies. 
Uncertainty and the recent crisis 
So how relevant are epistemological and ontological uncertainty to 
our understanding of the recent crisis? It is clear that in the last 
two decades epistemic uncertainty has increased, with 
devastating consequences for the assumption that market prices 
accurately reflect fundamentals. Financial markets and products 
have become much more complex; and the volume of relevant 
information has swamped the mental capacity of market 
participants to comprehend it, arguably outstripping even the 
growth in computer processing power. For example, Haldane has 
calculated that an investor in a typical CDO would need to read 
more than a billion pages of relevant prospectus information to 
understand its ingredients fully.
18
 In such circumstances, the 
comforting notion of market transparency becomes almost 
meaningless, while the standard idea that (at worst) one party to 
an exchange may be at an information disadvantage to another 
seems far less pertinent than the danger of symmetrical ignorance 
among all players. Moreover, it has proved fiendishly difficult for 
banks to calculate future risks when operating in a financial system 
of increasingly complex network interlinkages. When this 
complexity reached thresholds of computational intractability,
19
 
and multiplied exponentially the number of pathways for emotional 
contagion, epistemological uncertainty began to threaten the 
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possibility of modelling market dynamics if anything went wrong, 
further contributing to instability. 
As for the relevance of ontological uncertainty, we need look no 
further than the entirely novel dynamics in both primary and 
secondary markets since the mid-1990s caused by the continual 
invention of new subprime mortgage products and new derivative 
instruments for securitising these mortgages and bundling them 
up in ever more exotic ways. It is hard to see how historical data 
on the likelihood of mortgage default in the US housing market or 
on correlations between such defaults across regions (or indeed 
on volatility and correlations in associated secondary securitisation 
markets) could have been relevant after the scale of such 
innovation. The innovations ensured that it was simply impossible 
for the future to resemble the earlier financial environment 
captured by the historical data. And yet such historical data 
formed the bedrock of risk models assessing risks in the CDO 
and related markets.
20
 
In short, the risk models on which so much of the edifice of 
modern finance depended in the run-up to this crisis 
underestimated the epistemological uncertainty in modern 
markets and ignored the ontological uncertainty caused by rapid 
innovation. The complex non-linearities of financial networks and 
the multi-valence of social reality were rarely assessed and could 
not easily be codified in the dominant VaR models; while the 
ontological problem of innovation was assumed away in mostly 
Gaussian risk models that assumed that you could read the 
standard deviation ranges of future outcomes from the distribution 
of past returns. In one revealing sense, though, the problem of 
innovation was not totally ignored. It was often argued that it was 
preferable to base risk and capital requirement calculations on 
high frequency data from the recent past, because too much had 
changed for data from the more distant past to be relevant. But 
this argument was as inconsistent as it was dangerous. If only the 
recent past was considered relevant to the conditions of the day 
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because of the parameter-altering nature of innovation, it should 
have been obvious that the recent past might not be relevant to 
the near future either. At the same time, the practice of collecting 
data only from the period now dubbed „The Great Moderation‟ 
excluded readings from the market upheavals of the 1930s and 
1970s that might at least have given a better idea of the scale of 
instability that can suddenly engulf dynamic and innovative 
markets operating in uncertainty.
21
 
How to address uncertainty in financial markets 
So how could policymakers and regulators go about controlling 
uncertainty in financial markets, if risk models extrapolating from 
the past cannot deliver? A radical solution would be to limit the 
amount of product innovation (as well the scope for complex 
network interlinkages) in the financial sector. This would help 
ensure that the future is predictable enough to rely more safely on 
VaR and other risk models based on past data. Such a move 
might be deemed appropriate if the banking sector is seen merely 
as a utility sector supporting other entrepreneurial sectors in the 
economy where innovation is more socially useful and the impact 
of any consequent uncertainty is generally lower. The moral 
dilemma is that you have to choose between innovation and 
predictability, and if you want the financial sector to be more 
predictable (and the risks within it more easily forecastable) then 
you need to limit innovation in that sector. This would, of course, 
hurt profits (as well as limiting losses and uncertainty). But then, as 
Knight argued, a competitive system will only allow profits to be 
made if there is genuine uncertainty: “Profit arises out of the 
inherent, absolute unpredictability of things, out of the sheer 
brute fact that the results of human activity cannot be 
anticipated”.22 In a competitive market, predictable profits are 
                                        
21
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quickly competed away (at least in the absence of monopoly rents 
or asymmetries of information). Regulators should perhaps have 
seen high profits in the banking sector as a sign of building 
uncertainty. The masters of the universe were making huge 
returns partly by playing with the radical uncertainty bred of 
innovation. 
Taking the uncertainty caused by innovation seriously has 
implications for government action as well. Indeed, governments 
and regulators may be less nimble in sniffing out changes of trend 
than other market participants. Moreover, while government action 
(fiscal, monetary or regulatory) clearly has a crucial role in 
constructing certainty in markets, innovations in government policy 
and regulation are themselves sources of Knightian uncertainty. 
When a novel economic or regulatory regime is introduced, there 
are often unintended consequences, either because of the 
complexity of its interrelationship with existing policies and 
regulations, or because of the spate of innovations it inspires in 
firms looking to exploit new opportunities and loopholes. When 
the Federal Reserve experimented with exceptionally low interest 
rates to stave off the possibility of deflation after the collapse of 
the dotcom bubble, it presumably did not foresee the 
ramifications of its actions in stoking up a headlong search for new 
(riskier) high-yield products in the context of a newly deregulated 
market. And today, even on the implausible assumption that US 
and UK central banks have a robust model forecasting the likely 
direct effects of their innovative strategy of quantitative easing, it is 
inconceivable that their decision-function internalises all the 
indirect effects – such as the innovation of new retail savings 
products designed to beat inflation in a low interest rate era. The 
impact of such second-order innovative reactions to novel 
government policy is highly uncertain ex ante, not least because 
the exact form of the innovations cannot be known ahead of their 
invention.  
Models: the distortion of focus 
In order to understand why the failure of risk models to take 
account of Knightian uncertainty proved so catastrophic, it is 
Uncertainty,  Modelling Monocultures and the Financial Crisis  
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necessary to examine why using these risk models appears to 
have limited the capacity of bankers, regulators and rating 
agencies to spot what was going wrong before it was too late. So, 
too, while Dynamic Stochastic General Equilibrium models have 
been heavily criticised after the event for ignoring the role of the 
financial sector,
23
 this does not in itself explain why the central 
banks using them were blind to the negative impact of their loose 
monetary policy on the dangerous build-up of credit. In other 
words, why did the use of misleading or incomplete models lead 
to myopia? And why did shortcomings in the models not become 
obvious much sooner?  
To answer this question, it is helpful to remember the teaching of 
Romantic post-Kantian philosophers about the role played by 
metaphors (and by extension, models) in structuring our beliefs, 
actions and therefore social reality itself. The Romantics were 
clear that there is no single definitive and objective way of looking 
at the world; instead, the world-as-it-appears-to-us is partly the 
creation of our own minds. Our minds do not passively record and 
reflect facts „out there‟; nor do our beliefs merely imitate reality. 
Rather, in order to make sense of the chaos about us, we must 
supply an intellectual framework, a metaphorical colouring, a 
principle of selection. As Coleridge said, when arguing with a 
young scientist who thought he could analyse facts without first 
having a theory: “You must have a lantern in your hand to give 
light, otherwise all the materials in the world are useless, for 
you cannot find them, and if you could, you could not arrange 
them”.24 We cannot do without models and metaphors to help 
understand the world, any more than we can do without a lantern to 
see in the dark. But the problem with lanterns – and with theories 
and metaphors for that matter – is that the light they cast, the 
focus they bring, is inevitably limited. This means that if we use 
only one lantern – one theoretical framework – we are apt to 
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stumble over aspects of reality outside the area illuminated by our 
theory.
25
 To put it another way, the lens of metaphor or model can 
bias and distort our vision as well as focus it, and there is never 
only one right way of looking at an issue. Theoretical or modelling 
dogmatism makes us resemble a horse wearing blinkers, good at 
focusing straight ahead on one thing, but liable to miss what is 
coming at us from left field.  
Monocultures and the financial crisis 
Joseph Stiglitz has recently spelled out the relevance of this to the 
crisis. Noting that “we often discount information that is contrary 
to our cognitive frame”, he argues that economists‟ standard 
models made them “prone to equilibrium fictions” and 
consequently blind to the bubbles that were building.
26
 More 
broadly, it can be argued that the myopia induced by monovision – 
relying on one set of standard models – has been a major 
contributory factor in the crisis. Prior to 2007, many of the key 
players in both public and private sectors were so convinced that 
the Efficient Markets Hypothesis and neo-classical economic 
models were sufficient, and had so internalised this one 
perspective, that they were simply not predisposed to see 
problems that were emerging because their theoretical and 
conceptual framework had no place for them.
27
 Similarly, bankers 
were so reliant on Gaussian distribution-derived VaR models that 
most of them genuinely believed that what has since happened 
was unlikely to occur even once in the lifespan of the universe. It 
is not surprising that banks were not ready for the financial tsunami 
that hit them if they were relying on risk models that told them that 
the daily market moves that subsequently materialised in August 
2007 were as much as 25-standard deviation events.
28
 Worse 
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still, as Michael Power has pointed out, VaR models and related 
metrics of risk-adjusted return on capital became more than a 
„best practice‟ frame for the views of management about the risks 
they were running; they also became part of an “increasing 
conceptual convergence between regulatory management of 
economic capital and internal business models.”29 This elision 
between the previously distinct perspectives and cognitive frames 
of regulator and regulated under the Basel-II regime was to prove 
disastrous. As it turned out, partially blind bankers and traders 
were being regulated by those with exactly the same type of 
myopia. 
Analytical monocultures of this sort not only led to blindness to the 
unexpected. They also helped construct a dangerous 
homogeneity of behaviour and high correlations in markets that 
became truly terrifying. One of the many factors left out of risk 
models in the run-up to this crisis was the destabilising rise in 
correlations caused by the rapid internalisation of the same return-
on-equity strategies, the same accounting conventions and the 
same risk models across so many markets, all in the name of best 
practice and regulatory harmonisation. With everyone pursuing 
similar business and trading strategies, with similar trigger points 
for reducing exposures, the scene was set for a sudden reversal 
when something unexpected occurred. The implication is that 
economists, risk officers and regulators need to be aware of the 
extent to which dominant narratives, theories and norms construct 
behavioural regularities. They need to become sociologists and 
anthropologists as much as economists and quantitative 
modellers, since they have no choice but to interpret a pre-
interpreted world. As Keynes pointed out, the key to successful 
investing, especially in the short-run, is to anticipate shifts in the 
interpretations and conventional frames of other market 
investors.
30
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How to overcome modelling monocultures 
If the analysis above is correct then it becomes essential that 
economists, entrepreneurs and policy-makers learn how to avoid 
becoming locked into one cognitive frame. At the analytical level, 
this involves experimenting with new models, metaphors and 
perspectives as a method of switching cognitive spectacles. Such 
experimentation can enable improved diagnosis of features of 
multi-faceted markets that existing models fail to capture, and it 
can also help spot the emergence of novel patterns and trends. A 
good example of this in action is the growing use of modelling 
analogies from the field of epidemiology to analyse and manage 
the dynamics of default risk and market panic. Such models may 
be used to isolate and simulate the threshold effects and self-
reinforcing dynamics in markets that can render them so 
unpredictable – dynamics rarely reflected in the historical 
correlations used in standard risk models and largely ignored in 
standard economic models. As Haldane notes, these 
epidemiology modelling analogies may also suggest new 
approaches to regulation – such as focusing on the risk to the 
system posed by the most interconnected institutions, which in 
times of financial contagion act like “super-spreaders” of 
disease.
31
 
Modelling pluralism and experimentation with new metaphors and 
perspectives are surprisingly unpopular within academia and in the 
broader business and policy community, perhaps for different 
reasons. In the academic world there remains a fear that 
modelling eclecticism is less rigorous and productive than trying 
to improve standard models with bolt-on amendments. But 
eclecticism can be disciplined – with the choice of theory driven 
by the nature of the problem studied, and careful attention given to 
the boundaries of applicability of different models. Indeed, 
establishing clear boundaries of applicability can only enhance the 
effectiveness of both standard and less orthodox models. For 
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example, however useful they are in other areas, it stands to 
reason that standard equilibrium models in economics – with their 
assumptions of rationally optimising individuals – and standard 
Gaussian risk models are much less successful when modelling 
innovative markets, network interdependence and Knightian 
uncertainty; in these conditions, there is simply no basis for fully 
rational expectations and no possibility of optimisation.
32
 In the 
broader community, many chief executives and senior civil 
servants reject modelling pluralism because they have got out of 
the mindset of needing to exercise judgement about which model 
to use when or which message to focus on if the application of 
different models suggests the advisability of different courses of 
action. It is often more comforting to fall back on the latest shared 
definition of „best practice‟. But this is to forget that, in a world of 
Knightian uncertainty, it is impossible to know ex ante what best 
practice will be. 
The monoculture discourse of universal „best practice‟ is not the 
only shibboleth threatened by giving due weight to Knightian 
uncertainty. So, too, are the widespread normative discourses of 
„creating a level playing field‟ and „global solutions to global 
problems‟. For example, as Haldane argues, the attempt under 
the Basel II regime to ensure a level playing field for competition 
between financial centres „resulted in everyone playing the same 
game at the same time, often with the same ball ‟. The financial 
and regulatory world increasingly became a monoculture that (just 
like monocultures in agriculture) was highly susceptible to 
unforeseen diseases.
33
 The result was only ruination and despair. 
Dani Rodrik suggests broader reasons to be wary of prioritising 
such global solutions to shared problems: quite apart from the 
danger of convergence on the wrong set of structures, there is 
plenty of evidence that solutions embedded in national 
governance structures are more effective and democratically 
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accountable.
34
 But, as this paper argues, the strongest reasons to 
avoid regulatory monocultures at the global level are epistemic: in 
a world of Knightian uncertainty, heterogeneity of approach allows 
more experiments in regulation and governance, and a higher 
chance that some experiments will be successful and any failures 
will prove less than catastrophic.  
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